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1 Introduction
There is a widespread public perception in industrialized countries that globalization can
lead to a deterioration of labour conditions. The claim is that rich countries that open their
borders to trade with and FDI to poor countries are forced to reduce their labour standards
in order to keep up with the increased competition. This would lead to what has been called
a ￿race to the bottom￿in labour standards.
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North (see section 5 below for a detailed discussion). We do know, however, that there are
considerable international di⁄erences in occupational health and safety (OHS) standards. In
industrialized countries, employees are protected against excessive exposure to chemicals and
there are exposure limits for radiation protecting medical personnel and computer users sitting
in front of a screen or using wi-￿. Construction workers have to wear helmets and are protected
against falling by safety belts. More generally speaking, there are many regulations in place
targeted at guaranteeing the safety at workplaces. But what about developing countries? If
we are willing to concede a link between OHS standards and accident rates, the di⁄erence is
big. While in OECD countries the annual number of work-related fatal accidents per 100.000
employees is estimated to lie around 4, occupational accident rates rise up to 10 for India
or China or even above 20 for other Asian countries or sub-saharan Africa (H￿m￿l￿inen et
al., 2006). When countries compete with each other over international investments, do these
di⁄erences constitute ￿unfair competition￿ ? Can globalization potentially degrade labour
conditions in the rich countries?
Given the scarcity of empirical knowledge, this paper develops a theoretical framework
which identi￿es conditions under which capital out￿ ows in the form of FDI reduces labour
standards in the North. Based on this framework, we provide estimates of how important
the e⁄ects of globalization on OHS are from a quantitative perspective. We build on the
analysis of Donado and W￿lde (2010) who study how the presence of unions in a closed
economy a⁄ects OHS standards. Their central argument is the informational advantage of a
union compared to workers. Given that unions have many members, they can collect more
information than individuals and thereby are able to set OHS standards at a level which is
Pareto-superior (given realistic parameter assumptions) to levels under laissez-faire or when
set by a government. Narrative evidence from the history of OHS standards supports this
view.
In the present paper, we carry the analysis forward and consider the welfare impact of
unions in a globalizing world. We ask three questions: Given endogenous OHS standards in
the North set by unions, how does this a⁄ect international capital ￿ ows? Next, what are
the repercussions of these trade ￿ ows on northern standards? Finally, what are the e⁄ects of
rising OHS standards in the South? Our framework is a two-country world with a capital-
rich North and a capital-poor South. In addition to having more capital, the North has trade
unions that set high OHS standards. In the South, there are initially no unions and OHS
standards are therefore low. We allow for free trade in the ￿nal homogenous good and capital
and analyze the welfare impact on OHS standards. Capital ￿ ows from North to South until
its marginal productivity is equal in both regions. As in traditional factor movement models,
we ￿nd that the impact of globalization due to a better capital allocation is welfare increasing
for both regions. Since the capital stock in the North is reduced, we also ￿nd, however, that
workers￿wage income goes down, and trade unions react by reducing their demands on high
OHS standards. This a⁄ects welfare in the North negatively. This e⁄ect goes beyond the
2traditional distributional e⁄ect caused by factor movements.
We then consider the impact of globalization when trade unions are introduced in the
South. We show that higher OHS standards set by southern unions have a positive welfare
impact, as in the autarky case, but it also implies an increase in the marginal productivity
of capital in the South. This leads to even more capital ￿ owing from North to South. The
impact of globalization due to a better capital allocation is also unambiguously positive in
both regions. In the North, however, unions set even lower OHS standards, further reducing
northern welfare. In the South, the higher capital stock implies that unions increase southern
OHS standards, magnifying the positive impact of globalization on southern welfare.
We then ask how strong the two central predictions of our model are from a quantitative
perspective. These predictions are: (i) FDI in￿ ows into the South increase when labour
standards improve health/ productivity of workers and: (ii) Capital out￿ ows from the North
lead to a reduction of work standards in the North. Concerning (i), we ￿nd quantities which
are far from negligible: If the safety levels in the South were at the same level as in the North,
GDP in the South would be 6.3% higher. With respect to (ii), we ￿nd that labour standards
in the North do fall when capital ￿ ows into the South. But this e⁄ect is small - both when
we allow for a ￿what if globalization had not taken place￿ -scenario and when we increase
safety in the South. When the South increases safety standards, the negative welfare impact
in the North due to a reduction in the northern labour standards is overcompensated by the
positive welfare impact in the South due to better working conditions. Overall, world welfare
increases due to globalization. Again,with an increase of southern safety levels to northern
ones, northern GDP falls by .3% while world GDP as a whole would rise by .6%.
Our paper is related to various strands of the literature. First, there is a policy-oriented
discussion on labour standards and the e⁄ect of globalization2. Srinivasan (1996, 1998) shows
that endogenous labour standards will naturally di⁄er between countries with di⁄erent levels
of development - as we ￿nd in our analysis - and that diversity in labour standards is not
an argument against free trade. He also states that labour standards might not be provided
e¢ ciently in the presence of some market failures. Brown, Deardor⁄ and Stern (1996, 1998)
provide a broad overview and argue inter alia that in the case of market failures, minimum
safety standards do not automatically restore Pareto optimality. For an international trade
setup, universal labour standards will not internalize country-speci￿c ine¢ ciencies. We will
extend their arguments and focus more strongly on the issue of ine¢ ciencies and internaliza-
tion. Elliot and Freeman (2003) are more favourable to including labour standards into WTO
trading rules. Maskus (2004) in his discussion agrees that ￿individual enterprise owners can
gain from weak labor rights [...] even if the economy is generally harmed￿ . This is exactly our
starting point and the fundamental assumption we build into our model.3
2This literature in turn partially builds on more micro-oriented analyses of risk and regulation of which
labour standards are an example. An early survey of research on labour standards is by Dickens (1984). An
excellent recent introduction and overview is by Viscusi (2007). For further related literature, see section 5.
3Much more has been written in this relatively large but also very policy oriented literature. See sect.
3A paper which deserves special mention is by Dinopoulos and Zhao (2007) on child labour
and trade. Their framework is a small open economy with a modern and an agrarian sector.
Children are only employed in the agrarian sector. In their model-based analysis, they con-
clude that trade policies or FDI that increase the modern-sector output reduce the incidence
of child labor.4
Second, our paper is related to the ￿pro-union literature￿ . Various authors have stressed
that collective action of workers - in the form of unions or other - can be bene￿cial to an
economy. For examples, see Viscusi (1979, ch. 11), Malcomson (1983), Freeman and Medo⁄￿ s
(1984), Booth and Chatterji (1998), Agell (1999, p. F144), Brugiavini et al. (2001, ch. II.2.1),
Acemoglu et al. (2001) and Boeri and Burda (2009). This literature is presented in some
more detail in the companion paper by Donado and W￿lde (2010).
There is also a larger literature which analyses the role of unions in an international trade
setup focusing mainly on wage and welfare e⁄ects. Examples include Mezzetti and Dinopoulos
(1991), Brander and Spencer (1988), Naylor (1999), Zhao (1995, 1998), and Skaksen and
Słrensen (2001). None of these papers takes OHS issues into account.
Finally, there is a huge empirical literature on labour standards and globalization (very
broadly speaking). As the detailed discussion in section 5 will show, some of these analyses
indirectly support our view, especially prediction (i) from above, and none contradicts it.
Unfortunately, there is no study at this moment (to the best of our knowledge) which explicitly
analyses our quantitative prediction (ii) on health e⁄ects in the North.
2 The two-country model
2.1 Basic structure
Our model economy generalizes Donado and W￿lde (2010) to a two-country world consisting
of the capital-rich North and the South. Both countries produce a homogenous aggregate
good Y i, where i denotes either North or South. A typical ￿rm produces the quantity yi by
employing capital ki and labour li, the latter of which is measured in working hours. All ￿rms












where capital and labour inputs have the usual neoclassical e⁄ects on output. We assume
that all ￿rms can hire from a spot market. There are no hiring or ￿ring costs and it does not
take any time to ￿nd a worker. Factors are paid their value marginal product.
5.2.2 below.
4For a theoretical analysis of South-South competition leading (potentially) to lower standards in the sense
of ￿race to the bottom - from the bottom￿ , see Chau and Kanbur (2006)
4The central focus of this paper is occupational health and safety (OHS) in a global world.
This aspect is re￿ ected in the production process via the TFP component A(si). A job is
safe(r) if a worker is (more) certain to return home in good health after 8 (or more) hours of
work. We capture safer jobs by a higher si > 0.
Safe workplaces are clearly in the interest of the worker, and in many cases, OHS is also a
central concern for employers. More often, however, there is a fundamental con￿ ict of interest
since OHS measures are costly. For modelling purposes, we go to the extreme and exclude
￿rms from any bene￿ts from higher safety. We capture safety costs by letting OHS measures
reduce TFP, Asi < 0, where throughout the paper subscripts denote partial derivatives. Given
the spot market assumption, a sick worker would simply be replaced by a new healthy worker.
Utility of workers increases in consumption ci and health z (si) but with a decreasing slope.




















where Ni denote potential employment (also measured in hours and assumed to be ￿x) times
the share z (si) of time workers are healthy and can actually work. More safety, implying
more health, implies higher labour supply in each country.
We ￿nally turn to trade unions. Trade unions can operate at the country, sectorial or ￿rm
level. They played a very important historical role in setting OHS standards as discussed
in detail in Donado and W￿lde (2010). We assume here that unions operate at the ￿rm
level only. Due to the spot market assumption, there is no attachment of workers to the
￿rm. Hence, membership of ￿rm-level unions is just as volatile as employment at the ￿rm.
As a consequence, the union only cares about the overall well-being of the li workers in this
particular ￿rm. Given historical examples about union behaviour in now OECD countries and
preferences of households in (2), unions not only care about labour income wili, but they also












Labour income of union members depends on the market wage wi and on labour demand li
as chosen by the ￿rm. Depending on the importance attached to each of these two objectives,
the union might be called income-oriented or health-oriented.
2.2 Occupational health and safety
Health and safety standards in OECD countries are nowadays by and large being regulated
by government agencies. Historically speaking, however, worker movements or trade unions
5played a very important role. This is still the case for developing countries today where
governmental institutions are not as strong as in OECD countries. There is also evidence that
unions in developed countries still play an important role when it comes to the implementation
of statutory OHS standards. Weil (1991, 1992) shows that OHS standards are better enforced
in the presence of unionized workers. In the case of new technologies or new evidence on health
implications, physical working conditions are still today one important issue over which trade
unions and management bargain (Millward et al., 1992, pp. 249-254). Due to the historical
and current importance of unions for OHS in OECD countries, we will talk about OHS setting
in what follows as an activity which maximizes the utility function (4) of the union. One could
also think of (4) as the objective function of a government agency which took over the role
of unions to take care about OHS setting.5
We now ask what the OHS standard is in the North if standards are set by (i) a ￿rm-
level union/government agency and, as reference points, (ii) by a central planner focusing on
output and (iii) by a central planner focusing on welfare. For later purposes, we (iv) also
compute the interest-rate maximising OHS level. The respective objective functions and the
optimality conditions are summarized in tab. 1. For a derivation of optimality conditions, see
app. A.
agent objective function
consumption planner: sC C (s) = Y (A(s);K ￿ ￿(s);z (s)N) + r￿ (s)￿(s) (a)
welfare planner: sU U (s) = U (C (s);z (s)) (b)
￿rm-level union: sv v (s) = v (wl(s);z (s)) (c)



























sv "vwl"lA"As = "vz"zs (c)
sR "~ rA"As = "~ rL"zs (d)
(6)
Table 1 Optimal occupational health and safety levels in the North
5The analogy would not work entirely if government agencies take an economy-wide approach to OHS in
contrast to our ￿rm-level unions. If the government agency is structured according to industries as safety
standards are very industry-speci￿c, however, then the analogy would work. It would clearly be of interest to
look at OHS setting also from a political-economy point of view.
6For readability all elasticities throughout this paper are de￿ned as positive quantities. Only











for all xy 6= As: (7)
North-South capital ￿ ows are denoted by ￿6 and the equilibrium interest rate is denoted by
~ r:7
The optimality condition (6c) of ￿rm-level unions given the objective (5c) is identical to
the closed-economy ￿ndings of Donado and W￿lde (2010) as ￿rm-level unions look at the
wage only and take the aggregate capital stock as given. The central planner in a two-
country world does take into account, however, that more or less OHS standards imply more
or less capital. In addition to that, income is no longer given by domestic production but by
domestic production plus foreign capital income - which is consumption C (s) in (5a). The
welfare planner has structurally the same objective function (5b) as in the closed economy
but needs to take international capital ￿ ows into account. The objective function of capital
owners in (5c) adds domestic capital income to foreign capital income.
The left-hand sides (LHS) of the optimality conditions in (6) show the costs and the right-
hand sides (RHS) the bene￿ts of an increase in the safety level from each agent￿ s perspective.
In all three conditions the costs originate from a reduction of TFP caused by an increase
in the safety level, but the variables a⁄ected are di⁄erent. In fact, a lower TFP implies in
condition (6a) a lower consumption C (due to a reduction in both Y and ~ r), in condition
(6b) a lower welfare U (due to a reduction in consumption), and in condition (6c) a lower
union￿ s utility v (due to a reduction in the ￿rms￿labour demand l). For example, the LHS of
condition (6b) has a straightforward interpretation: A one-percentage increase in the safety
level reduces the TFP and thereby output by "Y A"As percent and the world interest rate
by "~ rA"As percent. Multiplying these terms with the consumption elasticity of welfare, "UC,
yields the percentage reduction in welfare due to a lower consumption. The second term is
weighted with ~ r￿=Y implying that the negative impact on consumption via a reduction in
the capital income is greater, the more important is capital income ~ r￿ relative to output Y .
The bene￿ts on the RHS of all three conditions originate from an improvement in the
health level z of the labour force. A higher health level implies in condition (a) a higher
consumption C (due to an increase in both Y and ~ r), in condition (6b) a higher welfare U
(due to an increase in consumption), and in condition (6c) a higher union￿ s utility v (since
better health has a direct positive impact on the union￿ s utility). Again, the RHS of (6b)
has a simple interpretation: A one-percentage increase in the safety level increases the health
6Maybe one should not talk about ￿ ows in a static model. Strictly speaking, ￿ is the stock of capital
installed in the South but owned by the North.
7When we want to stress that a variable or parameter belongs to the South, we denote it by an asterisk
"*". For the North, we use nothing, as in tab. 1 - which refers to the North only. In this sense, in section 2.1,
i stands for either nothing or this asterisk.
7level of the labour force, raising output by "Y L"zs percent and the world interest rate by "~ rL"zs
percent. Multiplying these terms with the consumption elasticity of welfare, "UC, yields the
percentage increase in welfare due to a higher consumption. Moreover, terms two and four,
"Uz"zs and "Uz"zs~ r￿=Y , on the RHS of (b) show that a better health also has a direct positive
impact on welfare.
There are three interesting aspects of the optimality conditions that should be highlighted.
First, if the planner focused only on consumption maximization (that is, if "Uz = 0), the
optimality condition (6b) would be reduced to (6a). Second, the optimality conditions (6a)
and (6b) are equal to their counterparts in the closed economy if we set ￿ = 0 (see Donado
and W￿lde 2010). Finally, even if condition (6c) is equal to its closed-economy counterpart,
the resulting safety levels are di⁄erent. The reason is that the safety levels are dependent
on aggregate wages and these wages depend positively on the country￿ s capital stock. As a
consequence, if capital leaves the country, wages are lower, and trade unions demand lower
safety levels.
To conclude, the trade-o⁄ for capital owners in (6d) is easy to understand. The LHS
shows the losses due to lower TFP, the RHS shows the gains in the North due to more
healthy workers. Both losses and gains a⁄ect capital owners through the equilibrium interest
rate ~ r:
2.3 Equilibrium
The North can undertake FDI and trade the ￿nal homogeneous good with the South. In
autarky, the South has a lower capital stock per capita and safety levels are lower as well.
For simplicity and without losing any insights, we consider the southern safety level to be
exogenous. As the law of one price holds without barriers to trade, the single determinant
for capital ￿ ows are international di⁄erences in the marginal product of capital. Using the
aggregate version of technology (1) and the equilibrium on the labour market (3), the marginal
product of capital in the North is given by
r = r(s;K ￿ ￿) = A(s)
@f (K ￿ ￿;z (s)N)
@ (K ￿ ￿)
; (8)
where K is the endowment of the capital stock in the North and ￿ are North-South capital
￿ ows. As this expression shows, OHS standards s have an ambiguous e⁄ect on the interest
rate: If the safety level is too low, capital owners are in favour of more safety since they see the
overall positive e⁄ect of healthier workers. If the safety level s is too high, the TFP-reducing
e⁄ect is stronger than the labour-supply e⁄ect.
Equilibrium on the world capital market requires equality of the factor rewards for capital,
r(s;K ￿ ￿) = r(s
￿;K
￿ + ￿); (9)
8where an asterisk denotes southern variables. This equation determines ￿; given the exoge-
nous autarky endowments K and K￿, an exogenous southern safety level s￿ and the endoge-
nous safety level s in the North, i.e. ￿ = ￿(s). The latter continues to be determined by
unions in the North as described by (6c). An equilibrium in our setup is therefore given by
(9) and (6c). These two equations determine two endogenous variables: capital ￿ ows ￿ from
North to South and safety levels s in the North.8
The equilibrium on capital markets is plotted in ￿g. 1. The horizontal axis shows the
northern capital stock from the left and the southern from the right such that the total
length of the horizontal axis re￿ ects world endowment with capital, K + K￿. The vertical
axis on the left shows the northern interest rate, the one on the right the interest rate in the
South. Capital demand curves plot loci which give the interest rate as a function of capital
used in the North and South, respectively.
Figure 1 Autarky equilibria Ni and Si and world equilibria Wi with free capital ￿ows
3 OHS under trade and capital ￿ ows
Let us now analyse the e⁄ects of ￿globalization￿ , i.e. international capital ￿ ows, on safety
standards and thereby on output and welfare.
8Keeping s￿ exogenous simpli￿es the exposition. It becomes endogenous if we assume that an equation
in analogy to (6c) would hold for the South as well. We would then have a setup where unions do not act
strategically. One could study also North-South games to explain why international union cooperation so
often failed in the past (see p. 14 for references).
93.1 Capital ￿ ows in a two-country world
Thinking of a scenario where countries are in autarky and then open up for capital ￿ ows, let us
assume ￿rst that countries in autarky di⁄er only in their per-capita capital stock. There are
no union activities and safety levels are identical and low. When the initial capital endowment
before capital ￿ ows is given as drawn in ￿g. 1, factor rewards in the South at S1 are higher
than in the North at N1. With free capital ￿ ows, the new world-equilibrium point is at W1
where capital ￿ ows from the North to the South of a total volume of ￿1 imply an equalisation
of returns to capital.
Are capital ￿ ows from the North to the South a realistic description of reality? It is well-
known that the US as one of the richest countries in the world is one of the biggest recipient of
foreign investments. When capital ￿ ows of ￿all￿countries in the world are analysed, capital
￿ ows from the North to the South from the 70s to the mid 80s to reverse subsequently and
to ￿ ow South to North from the end of the 90s (Prasad et al., 2006, chart 2). If the focus is
on FDI, however, capital always ￿ ows from North to South (chart 4). If the world without
US is analysed, capital also ￿ ows from North to South (chart 3). Lane and Milesi-Ferretti
(2006, ￿g. 9) make a similar point: Net foreign assets (i.e. accumulated ￿ ows) are positive
for industrialized countries and negative for the US and emerging and developing countries.
Capital ￿ ows from North to South are therefore a realistic view of the world if the focus is
on FDI (which comes the closest to our variable ￿ in this long-run static equilibrium) or if
the focus is on industrialized countries other than the US.9
Second, if we introduce trade unions in the North, the autarky safety level is higher than
without unions. Let us assume this OHS level does not respond to changes in the capital
stock. Donado and W￿lde (2010, sect. 5.3) have shown that this holds for the ￿rm-level union
if the union￿ s objective function (4) has a Cobb-Douglas structure. As long as this OHS level is
not beyond the capital-return maximizing point (i.e. as long as sv < sR from (6)), the capital
demand function moves up from r1 to r2. As has been discussed after the expression for the
marginal productivity of capital in (8), capital owners are actually in favour of higher safety
levels as long as this has a positive e⁄ect on capital rewards. Starting with the same initial
capital distribution, the starting points are now S1 and N2 and the new world-equilibrium
point is W2: Capital ￿ ows from the North to the South are now lower and amount to ￿2 only.
Higher (but not too high) safety levels reduce capital out￿ ows from the North.
When we return to the realistic situation where health and income are bad substitutes,10
safety standards fall after capital out￿ ows. Starting from N2 and S1 as before, capital out￿ ows
will lead to a ￿temporary￿equilibrium at W2: Falling OHS levels reduce the northern capital
9If one focuses on gross ￿ ows, it is even more apparent that North-South ￿ ows are very relevant. Capital
out￿ ows from the US from 1960 to 2007 are on average 3.8 times higher than (absolute) net ￿ ows (BEA,
2008).
10This corresponds to a negative ￿ in our CES utility function further below in (16). See Donado and
W￿lde (2010, sect. 5.3) for a proof.
10demand function to r3 and the ￿nal equilibrium point is W3: Capital out￿ ows are larger due to
the fall in OHS levels in the North but still lower than under a situation without any northern
OHS standards. Generally speaking, this contradicts the often stated view that capital ￿ ows
to where standards are lower. If standards are so low that marginal productivity of capital
su⁄ers, capital will stay in the North.
3.2 Capital ￿ ows and welfare
Let us now turn to the welfare e⁄ects of international capital ￿ ows. Welfare in both countries
by (5b) is a function of consumption and health. In the North, endogenous OHS standards
s and therefore health are a function of capital ￿ ows, z (￿) = z (s(K ￿ ￿)). In the South,
health z￿ (s￿) is exogenous due to exogenous safety levels s￿. Consumption in the North is
given by domestic production plus capital income from abroad, Y + r￿￿, while in the South
it is domestic production minus capital income paid to foreign capital owners in the North,
Y ￿ ￿ r￿￿. Making the dependence of consumption on capital ￿ ows ￿ explicit, we obtain an
expression related to (5a),
C = Y (A(s(K ￿ ￿));K ￿ ￿;z (s(K ￿ ￿))N) + r
￿ (K











￿ + ￿)￿; (11)
we see that capital ￿ ows ￿ a⁄ect the northern consumption level through TFP, the capital
stock, labour supply and the northern interest income. For the South, only the southern
capital stock and the interest payments are a⁄ected. Computing the welfare e⁄ects of capital



















￿￿ > 0; (13)
where again subscripts denote partial derivatives: e.g. r￿
￿ is the change in the southern
interest rate due to capital in￿ ow into the South.
Capital ￿ ows in￿ uence northern welfare through the ￿classic channel￿ , the ￿e¢ ciency
channel￿ and the ￿health channel￿ . The ￿rst term in (12) starting with UC is the classic
channel which says that if the southern interest rate r￿ does not react to capital ￿ ows from
the North (that is, if r￿
￿￿ = 0), there are welfare gains as long as the foreign interest rate
is larger than the domestic one (r￿ > r). This is the well-known condition for gains from
capital mobility. However, if a sizable amount of capital has already ￿ own and the southern
interest rate falls when more capital ￿ ows (that is, if r￿
￿￿ < 0), there might not be gains
from additional capital ￿ ows. In fact, in a two-country world, welfare-maximizing capital
11￿ ows should stop before the domestic interest rate equals the foreign one.11 As the gains
from higher capital rewards abroad overcompensate the losses from the fall in the foreign
capital rewards when capital ￿ ows just start, we conclude that overall there are gains from
international capital ￿ ows.
The second term, UCYs@s=@￿, can be called the ￿e¢ ciency channel￿ . If the planner in
the North maximized output and set OHS standards equal to sY, this term would be zero,
Ys = YAAs + YLzsN = 0. The negative TFP e⁄ects of safety (the expression YAAs) would
just be compensated by the positive labour supply e⁄ect YLzsN. If, however, OHS standards
were below the output-maximizing safety sY, that is if Ys > 0, and noting that an out￿ ow of
capital reduces the safety level (@s=@￿ < 0, as discussed after ￿g. 1), a further reduction of s
due to capital out￿ ows would increase ine¢ ciencies in the North and thereby reduce output.
The ￿nal term in (12) Uzzs@s=@￿ is more related to trade unions and their impact on
higher OHS standards. The closer the union-set safety level is to the social welfare-maximizing
level sU, the higher the social welfare is. If the union safety level is lower than sU, that is, if
Uz > 0, any reduction in safety (due to capital out￿ ows) reduces welfare. Consequently, the
welfare e⁄ect of reduced OHS standards is negative.
Combining all three channels, capital ￿ ows increase northern welfare due to a more e¢ cient
factor allocation but reduce welfare since less capital implies lower OHS standards which were
too low already before capital ￿ ows. This reduction has a negative e⁄ect on e¢ ciency and
on health per se. Welfare gains through capital ￿ ows are therefore reduced by negative OHS
e⁄ects.12
For the South, however, the welfare e⁄ects are unambiguously positive. For each unit of
capital ￿ owing into the country, it pays the local marginal product. Hence, the term r ￿ r￿
we see in (12) is zero in (13). It bene￿ts, however, from the reduction of the domestic interest
rate due to in￿ ows, r￿
￿ < 0. There is no health channel as safety standards are invariant.
4 Trade unions go global!
This section is motivated by the general discussion about the desirability of trade unions and
their role in a global world. Given competition between the North and the South, can the
North a⁄ord to have ￿old-fashioned￿institutions like trade unions? Do not ￿modern global
times￿require to abolish unions such as to make a country more ￿competitive￿ ? Or should
governments rather encourage activities of trade unions also in the South?
11This e⁄ect must be known from the literature on international factor ￿ ows in two-country worlds or in
the case of large (i.e. not small) open economies. So far, however, we have been unable to ￿nd a reference.
We are grateful to Juergen Meckl for discussion of this point.
12Clearly, if one believes that OHS standards are excessive, i.e. above sU; capital out￿ ows implying a
reduction of safety levels would imply welfare gains due to capital ￿ ows per se and due to reduced OHS
standards.
12In order to address these questions, we now ask how the results obtained so far are a⁄ected
if trade unions are also introduced in the South. What are the welfare consequences for the
North, the South, and the world economy and how would northern trade unions react to this?
4.1 International capital ￿ ows and OHS
We stipulate that an increased presence of trade unions in the South would increase southern
safety levels. If we assume that this new level is still lower than the interest-maximizing
southern safety (that is, if s￿ < sR￿), an increase in the southern safety level will increase the
capital demand curve from r￿
1 to r￿
2 (see ￿g. 1). Capital owners are better o⁄. Of course the
question arises why it takes trade unions to help capital owners to increase their returns to
investment. The answer is simple, however: In a society with few economic institutions and
no well-functioning ￿nancial systems, each capital owner is basically an entrepreneur who
owns his own ￿rm. OHS standards imply costs but there are no institutions which would
allow capital owners to coordinate their activities and credibly jointly increase the safety
level. Firms are caught in a prisoners￿dilemma. The need for higher safety levels is more
pressing for workers as they are physically a⁄ected through negative health e⁄ects. Hence,
even though each individual ￿rm in the South will be opposed to higher OHS standards,
capital owners as a group will gain.
For an invariant safety level in the North (again, the Cobb-Douglas case for union pref-
erences (4)), this implies that the equilibrium moves from W2 to W4 and the ￿ ow of capital
to the South increases from ￿2 to ￿4. For the empirically most relevant bad-substitution
case (i.e. ￿ < 0 in the parametric version below in (16)), capital out￿ ows to the South reduce
safety levels in the North. If safety levels were below the interest rate maximizing level sR,
capital demand in the North would be reduced from r3 to r4 and the equilibrium would move
from W3 to W5. Capital out￿ ows from the North would increase from ￿3 to ￿5.
At ￿rst sight it might be surprising that an introduction of trade unions in the South
can increase capital in￿ ows to this country. But, if TFP losses are not too strong, northern
investors simply pro￿t form a healthier labour force in the South. This idea is supported
by empirical evidence. For example, Alsan et al. (2006) ￿nd that an improvement in a
population￿ s health increases gross FDI in￿ ows to low- and middle-income countries. More
directly, Flanagan (2006) ￿nds a signi￿cant negative correlation between fatal job accident
rates and FDI in￿ ows. See sect. 5 for more details. If trade unions can play a similar role in
the South today as they played historically in nowadays OECD countries, trade unions can
be good for health and growth of a developing country.
4.2 Global unions and welfare
￿ The North and the South
13What are the welfare implications if trade unions in the South increase the southern safety
























These conditions look similar to those in (12) and (13) where the e⁄ects of capital ￿ ows were
analysed. In fact, term one in (14) corresponds to the classic channel above. In contrast to
above, however, we start from an integrated world economy with r = r￿ and capital ￿ ows are
now induced by changes in southern OHS standards s￿. However, this term is now positive
since we are making the plausible assumption that the southern safety level s￿ is lower than
the interest-maximizing safety level sR￿. The second term is the e¢ ciency channel and the
third term is the direct health channel. More safety in the South has a positive e⁄ect on
interest payments but reduces output and the health level in the North.
We saw above that capital ￿ ows increase northern welfare but falling OHS standards
can reduce these welfare gains. What remains here on balance? First of all, an increase in
southern safety increases interest rates paid on previous investments ￿ since r￿
s￿ > 0. As
opposed to (12), the classic channel leads here to gains for the North: Higher s￿ increases
returns for investors as higher labour supply in the South increases marginal productivities
of capital in the South (by more than lower southern TFP would reduce it). The second,
e¢ ciency, channel is negative if the safety level in the North is below its output-maximizing
level (i.e. Ys > 0) and if more safety in the south implies capital out￿ ows from the North and
thereby a reduction of safety levels in the North, i.e. @s=@s￿ < 0. The third channel does not
bring good news for the North either: If OHS standards s and thereby the average health
level fall, welfare goes down through this health channel as well.
For the South, two new terms as compared to (13) appear. The second and third term can
easily be identi￿ed as the e¢ ciency and health channels in the South. Term one is negative;
terms two and three are positive: The South looses from higher interest payments to the
North but gains from e¢ ciency gains in production due to higher OHS standards and from
health per se.
￿ The con￿ ict between northern and southern unions
There are numerous examples in the media where northern trade unions help establish
southern unions. One often mentioned reason is that unions in the South increase southern
wages which reduces low-wage competition in the North. Looking at trade union cooperation
in more detail, however, quite some authors have suggested that international cooperation
has been rather marginal (see, for example, Northrup and Rowan (1979), Enderwick (1985),
pp. 147-154, and the references therein, and Gordon and Turner (2000)). Our model suggests
14one possible reason why there is actually a con￿ ict between northern and southern unions.
Both unions bene￿t from capital ￿ ows. More capital means higher wages and, as a conse-
quence, higher safety levels. Both enter the objective function of unions positively. Building
up a union in the South implying higher safety levels results in a capital out￿ ow and northern
union members lose.
5 Quantitative ￿ndings
Our model makes two central qualitative predictions: (i) FDI in￿ ows increase when labour
standards improve health/ productivity of workers such that returns to capital investment
increase. (ii) Capital out￿ ows from the North lead to a reduction of work standards in the
North. The purpose of this section is to o⁄er a quantitative picture of these predictions. How
strong are these e⁄ects? Before we do so, however, we o⁄er a brief survey of related empirical
work. This will allow us to put our ￿ndings into a broader context and draw more convincing
conclusions about the central question posed in the title of our paper.
There is relatively good empirical support for our ￿rst prediction. The second prediction
will sound controversial to many. When we look at existing empirical work, however, there is
no study which contradicts our view and there are some who indirectly support it.13
5.1 The e⁄ect of standards
The empirical literature can be classi￿ed into whether standards are used as an explanatory
variable or whether standards are to be explained. When standards are used as explanatory
variables, one can inquire into the e⁄ect e.g. on trade patterns. The OECD (2000) provides
a summary of various studies. They ask whether labour standards in￿ uence or ￿bias￿trade
patterns in any way. While there are some surprising ￿ndings (higher standards reduce
exports of skilled-intensive goods), it is not always straightforward to draw conclusion from
these ￿ndings. See Brown (2000) for a detailed appraisal.
One can also analyse the e⁄ects of standards on FDI. Flanagan (2006, p. 135 and tab. A6.3)
points out that ￿with one exception, labor conditions in a country are not signi￿cantly corre-
lated with the country￿ s share of investment in￿ ows. The exception is job safety: other things
equal, investment shares are lower in countries with relatively high fatal job accidents rates.￿
Other labour standards (like right for collective bargaining etc.) have basically no e⁄ect.
A study which does not explicitly use standards as an explanatory variable is undertaken
by Alsan et al. (2006). They ￿nd empirical evidence that an improvement in a popula-
13Before we proceed, it is worth pointing out that we do not take into account the huge empirical literature
on the e⁄ects of trade on wages, relative wages or unemployment. While this might sound obvious, some
commentators conclude that trade can not have an e⁄ect on standards as it has no e⁄ect on the wage
structure. We believe that conclusions of this type are not really supported by evidence.
15tion￿ s health increases gross FDI in￿ ows to low- and middle-income countries. They measure
population health by life expectancy. The study is useful for our question as a simple (yet
conditional) conclusion can be drawn from it. If standards have a positive e⁄ect on life
expectancy (something one would expect), better standards increase FDI.
5.2 Determinants of standards
Generally speaking, the empirical literature ￿nds that there are no harmful e⁄ects of trade
or FDI on labour standards in the South. We did not ￿nd any explicit analysis of the e⁄ects
on northern countries.
5.2.1 The child labour literature
In the child-labour literature, Edmonds and Pavcnik (2006) ￿nd that countries that trade
more have less child labour. They attribute this relationship to the positive e⁄ect of trade
on income. Levine and Rothman (2006) have basically very similar ￿ndings. Neumayer and
Soysa (2005) ￿nd that the e⁄ect of FDI is just as positive as trade. This e⁄ect is con￿rmed
by Davies and Voy (2009). This suggests that globalization is not that bad after all for the
South.
Davies and Voy (2009) use data from the ILO on labour force participation of children
aged 10-14 as their dependent variable. They ￿nd in their regressions, instrumented, pooled
or not, that FDI has a negative signi￿cant or a negative insigni￿cant e⁄ect on child labour.
The e⁄ect becomes insigni￿cant when income is added as an explanatory variable. As income
is highly signi￿cant in basically all of their regressions (tables 1 to 3), child labour seems to
be a poverty problem but not an FDI problem. They conclude that FDI is a good instrument
to combat child labour as FDI increases income.
5.2.2 Informal discussions of labour standards
There is a huge literature which discusses labour standards and the e⁄ects of globalization in
an informal way. This literature is very informative and full of details but can not be used as
a test for our model. An excellent introduction to issues surrounding labour standards and
trade is provided by Basu et. al (2003). Aspects related to ￿races to the bottom￿are discussed
in this book by Singh (2003, part II, ch. 2). OECD (2000) has a short informal section on
￿race to the bottom￿ . Various informal discussions stress that competition under perfect
information limits the possibilities of ￿rms to reduce labour standards. It is acknowledged
that this might not hold in second-best economies. Historical evidence on the US seems to
suggest that there was a race to the bottom concerning child-labour before 1938.
Elliot and Freeman (2003, p. 126) conclude their detailed description of various case studies
by "trade pressure and incentives from consumers and governments can lead to improved labor
16standards in LDCs". In this sense, trade combined with the right incentives is bene￿cial for
standards as well.
5.2.3 Investigating standards more directly
Turnbull and Wass (2007) provide a careful analysis of various case studies on the e⁄ect of
reforms in ports. They argue that "globalization [...] brought in its wake a marked deteriora-
tion in dock workers￿terms and conditions of employment." They ￿nd that reforms generally
worsen working conditions of workers. These results are not derived, however, by standard
econometric analysis.
The most informative analysis is undertaken by Flanagan (2006). He uses various measures
for standards as dependent variable. They include ￿weekly hours￿ , ￿life expectancy￿or ￿child
labour￿but also ￿fatal accidents￿(on the job). As reported in tab. A3.3, GDP per capita
signi￿cantly reduces fatal accidents (and also child labour or weekly hours). These results are
less strong, however, when additional institutional variables are added as explanatory variables
(tab. A3.4), at least for fatal accidents. In a panel analysis with ￿xed e⁄ects (tab. A4.1),
the trade share and a measure of ￿open policy￿has a negative impact on fatal accidents.
Unfortunately, the complete results of regressions including GDP per capital and openness
measures are not reported. One could conclude, however, that trade and higher GDP per
capital reduces job injuries and improve standards. This is similar to the ￿ndings of FDI and
trade on child labour cited above.
This positive conclusion is in line with Flanagan himself who, generally speaking, draws a
very positive picture about the link between trade and standards. He also ￿nds, however, that
￿rms in import-competing sectors in the North tend to reduce (or at least do not increase)
labour standards. (The same is true for some ￿rms in export-processing zones.) He also states
(p. 85) that ￿more open trade may be threatening the working conditions of some workers in
industrialized countries￿ .
5.3 Our quantitative predictions
We now return to our two-country world and calibrate it such that various targets are met.
We then use this calibrated version in order to analyse the e⁄ects of international capital
￿ ows on northern safety and the e⁄ects of unions in the South.
5.3.1 Calibration
￿ Functional forms and ￿rst-order conditions


















Following Donado and W￿lde (2010), the link between safety s and TFP A(s) and the share
z (s) of the healthy workforce is assumed to follow
A(s) = be
￿￿s; z (s) = 1 ￿ qe
￿￿s: (18)
The parameter b gives the upper bound to TFP which is obtained under zero safety measures
(s = 0). The elasticity of TFP with respect to safety is captured by ￿. Similarly, q captures
the share of sick individuals in an economy without safety measures and ￿ is the response
elasticity with respect to s. Optimal safety levels for these functional forms are special cases
of the general results in (6) and are provided in tab. 2.
optimality condition

























Table 2 Optimal safety levels for speci￿c functional forms
The (￿rm-level) union safety level is known from Donado and W￿lde (2010, tab. 1 (c)). The
expression does not change as a ￿rm-level union takes aggregate quantities as given, both in
a closed and in an open economy. The actual level sv can of course di⁄er as sv is a function
of endogenous variables such as the domestic capital stock.
It is remarkable that the expression for the consumption maximizing safety level sC is
also identical to the one of the closed economy. Whether a planner maximizes consumption
in a closed economy (where consumption is identical to output) or in a two-country world,
the planner always chooses the same level sC: Note that this consumption maximizing health
level sC is identical to the interest-rate maximizing level sR: This is due mainly to the Cobb-
Douglas structure of the production function and reminds of identical closed-economy results
in Donado and W￿lde (2010).
￿ Parameter values
18Given these functional forms, we can now calibrate our model. As we would like to un-
derstand the implications of various policy experiments, we need an initial equilibrium which
re￿ ects the real world in a quantitatively su¢ ciently good way. Our initial equilibrium should
satisfy four targets. It should display (i) a reasonable endogenous share z (sv) of healthy work-
ers in the North, (ii, iii) GDP levels in the North and South which represent relative economic
importance and (iv) a share z
￿
sC￿




> z (sv). This makes sure that trade unions do have some e⁄ect in increasing
safety levels above the level desired by each individual ￿rm. Unions do not succeed, however,
in pushing the safety level all up the way to the consumption-maximizing level. We believe
this to be a plausible outcome of some deeper political-economy mechanism where ￿rms and
￿rm-level unions determine safety levels.
The desired quantities for these targets are shown in the upper left part of tab. 3. In the
European Union, 2% of working days are lost due to health issues related to work (Parent-
Thirion et al., 2007, Table 7.3), i.e. z (sv) = :98. Relative economic importance of the North
and the South is captured by setting Y to GDP of the average G7 country and Y ￿ to the
population-weighted mean of China and India.14 Our calibration therefore captures the e⁄ect
of integrating capital markets of the average of China￿ s and India￿ s economies with capital




We further set various parameters at levels which correspond to observations in the data.
This group appears in the upper right corner of tab. 3. Taking into account that accident
rates in non-industrialized countries are 4 to 6 times higher than in industrialized countries
(H￿m￿l￿inen et al., 2006), the absence rate due to health is, say, 5 ￿ 2% = 10% in the South
and therefore z￿ = :9. The parameter q will determine (see the discussion after (18)) the share
of healthy workers when there are no safety measures at all. If we are willing to assume that
high accident countries (i.e. z = :9) are countries with close to no safety measures (i.e. s = 0),
we can conclude q = :1 from (18). The output elasticity ￿ for capital is standard and does not
need further discussion. Population size N in the North is normalized to unity and population
size N￿ in the South corresponds to the ratio of the population size of China plus India to
the population size of G7 countries.
Parameters which are not reported in the table are ￿; ￿, ￿ and K+K￿: The parameters ￿
and ￿ from (18) matter only as their ratio ￿ ￿ ￿=￿ to be discussed below. The parameter ￿
is set equal to ￿1 (which is the bad-substitution case often referred to above) and does have
only minor e⁄ects on parameters or equilibrium properties. The world capital stock was set
to 300 which gives a reasonable interest rate of 4.9%.
We hit our targets z (sv); Y; Y ￿ and z
￿
sC￿
by calibrating the parameters b; b￿; ￿ and
￿ ￿ ￿=￿; taking equilibrium equations (9) and (6c) from tab. 1 of our model into account.
The parameters are shown in the lower left corner. For a summary of calibration equations,
see app. D.5.
14All nominal data is in 2006 PPP US$. All data is taken from World Bank (2008).
19endogenous quantities to be matched

























Table 3 Calibrating the free capital ￿ow equilibrium (see text for details)
The calibrated values are in the range one would expect. Relative TFP between the North
and South implied by b and b￿, is maybe a bit larger than usual; if di⁄erences in education
and experience levels between workers in the North and South is taken into consideration,
however, relative TFP would go down and become closer to standard ratios. The parameter
with a relatively high value is ￿; the weight attached by unions to labour income.
In the resulting equilibrium, 84.3% of the world capital stock is used in the North. The
health level of a welfare maximizing planner would be 99.7% i.e. it exceeds the output maxi-
mizing level by 0.7%.
5.3.2 Quantitative globalization e⁄ects on northern safety
We can now provide an estimate of how much safety in the North fell (or rose) due to
globalization. We know the stock of wealth F i for country i held abroad from estimates by
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). We obtain comparable capital stocks Ki in G7 countries from
AMECO (2010). When F i is positive, we assume that the capital stock in a hypothetical
closed economy would be Ki + F i: This is clearly an extreme view where any unit of capital
invested abroad is one unit lost at home (there is evidence on the aggregate level supporting
this assumption, see Desai et al., 2005). We see the implied estimate for the loss of safety due
to globalization as an upper bound. The true value probably lies below the one we report.
For countries where F i is negative, globalization implied an in￿ ow of capital, improved the
domestic health level and the hypothetical closed economy would be endowed with Ki only.
In both cases, we can compute the hypothetical safety level s
hyp
i in this hypothetical closed
economy i with a hypothetical capital stock of Ki (when F i is negative) and Ki + F i (when
F i is positive) by using expression (6c) for the ￿rm-level union. As we discussed above, this
expression is identical to the closed-economy setup of Donado and W￿lde (2010, tab. 1).
Hence, by computing s
hyp
i using (6c) with the hypothetical capital stock, we obtain the safety
level in such a non-globalized closed economy. The di⁄erence between s
hyp
i and the percentage
of healthy workers as given in the data (we used .98 above in tab. 3 in our EU average) is the
gain or loss due to globalization.
20When looking at the ratio of ￿ ￿ (Ki + F i)=Ki for G7 countries (excluding Japan for
data inconsistency reasons) from 1991 to 2004, it varies from 82.2% (i.e. F i < 0) for Canada
in 1991 to 105.9% for Germany in 1991. For all years where ￿ < 100%, globalization actually
improved health levels in the North as capital ￿ ew into the country. Starting from our 98%
health level under globalization from tab. 3, the range we attribute to globalization extends
from an increase of the health level in the North from 97.85% without international capital
￿ ows to 98% (the Canadian case) and a decrease from 98.04% to 98% (the German case).
These results are clearly very small and negligible. Even a reduction of the capital stock
by 20% leads to an increase of the sickness rate from 2% to 2.15% only. The main reason for
this very low capital-stock-to-health elasticity is the fact that the North is very close to the
social optimum. At this point, the slope of health with respect to the capital stock is very
low. As our estimates are an upper bound, we can conclude that Northern inhabitants should
not worry too much about negative e⁄ects of capital out￿ ows on Northern health standards.
5.3.3 The quantitative e⁄ects of southern unions
Qualitatively, we have seen that the North tends to lose from higher OHS standards in the
South, northern unions are de￿nitely worse o⁄ and only the South seems to gain. Should
OHS standards in the South then be increased? We can provide a more convincing answer
to this question quantifying the e⁄ects. Starting from the equilibrium in tab. 3, our policy
experiment consists in increasing the Southern level z￿ from .9 to the Northern level of .98.
Put di⁄erently, absence rates decrease in the South from 10% to 2%.
The implied capital ￿ ows from the North to the South constitute the ￿real test￿for our
calibration as these ￿ ows should be consistent with the estimates of Alsan et al. (2006). They
￿nd that every additional year of life expectancy implies a 9% increase in FDI in￿ ows to low-
and middle-income countries. Average life expectancy in their sample is 64.6 years, i.e. one
can translate an additional year into a 100/65%￿1.5% increase in hours worked. Increasing
hours worked from 90% to 98% in our counter-factual experiment corresponds to an increase
of approx. 9% (not percentage points), i.e. an increase of 9=1:5 = 6 additional years in life
expectancy. Such a change should imply an increase of in￿ ows of 6*9%=54%. As 1$ of
in￿ ows amounts to an increase of domestic investment of 1$ (on the aggregate level, see Desai
et al., 2005) and investment to capital stock ratios are around 10%, a 54% increase in in￿ ows
implies a 5.4% increase in the capital stock. Hence, our policy experiment where we increase
southern health shares from 90% to 98% should imply an increase of the southern capital
stock by 5.4%.
We ￿nd that our capital ￿ ows amount to a 6.7% increase in the southern capital stock,
i.e. they are very consistent with the ￿ndings of Alsan et al. (2006).15 Concerning health
e⁄ects, international capital ￿ ows imply a decrease of safety levels s in the North which imply
15We did try to calibrate ￿ such that the ￿ ows would match exactly the ones in the data. While ￿ does
have an e⁄ect on the ￿ ows, it is much too small in order to be relevant here.
21that the share z (s) of time individuals are healthy decreases by 0.006%. GDP in the North
decreases by 0.29% and increases in the South by 6.3% implying an increase of world GDP
by .6%. Put di⁄erently, rising OHS standards in the South do have a theoretical but not a
practical negative e⁄ect on work standards in the North. Similarly, higher southern standards
do reduce domestic production in the North, but only by a negligible amount. In contrast,
southern production increases considerably, leading overall to an increase in world output.
5.3.4 What does this tell us?
Given our brief survey of the empirical literature and given our quantitative results, what do
we learn from this? Concerning our ￿rst prediction on FDI in￿ ows, our ￿ndings are in line with
the ￿ndings of Flanagan (2006) and (indirectly) Alsan et al. (2006) on the e⁄ects of standards
as explanatory variables for capital in￿ ows. We provide a theoretical setup which o⁄ers a
possible explanation to their ￿ndings that lowering fatal job accident rates and increasing life
expectancy increases FDI. The new condition we identify for these ￿ndings to be theoretically
consistent says that OHS standards in the South are lower than the interest-rate maximizing
safety level sR: If this is the case, any improvement increases in￿ ow of FDI. If some countries
have well-functioning institutions and the safety level is close to sR; the e⁄ect of an increase
of OHS standards - while it could still increase welfare - might reduce FDI in￿ ows.
Let us turn to the second strand of the literature inquiring into the determinants of
standards (mainly in the South). According to our setup, it is no surprise to ￿nd no e⁄ect of
trade and FDI in the South if the South lacks institutions which face and solve a health-wage
trade-o⁄ as modelled here for the North in (4). It would be very interesting to look at the
e⁄ects of FDI out￿ ows on safety in the North: our second prediction claims that an out￿ ow
of capital in the North reduces standards in the North. If we translate this into an empirical
statement, we need to be careful about ￿out￿ ow of capital￿ . Our model really predicts that
a reduction in the capital stock in the North (keeping TFP constant) reduces standards in
the North. We therefore would not expect that large FDI out￿ ows reduce standards if the
domestic capital stock does not change. Similarly, large FDI out￿ ows even with a reduction
of the domestic capital stock would not reduce standards according to our model, if there is a
simultaneous TFP increase which keeps labour income again as in (4) constant. Care should
therefore be taken when trying to identify the e⁄ects of FDI out￿ ows on capital stocks and
wages.
Evaluating the second prediction given that we have seen here that e⁄ects are probably
very small and that FDI ￿ ows relative to stocks are also very small, we would conclude that
globalization is bad for labour standards in the North - but only in some marginal sense.
If globalization acts through the channels we have looked at here, there is no need for big
concerns.
226 Conclusion
There are three questions we pose in this paper: What are the e⁄ect of international di⁄erences
in occupational health and safety (OHS) standards on international capital ￿ ows? What
is the e⁄ect of these capital ￿ ows (i.e. ￿globalization￿ ) on OHS standards when the latter
are endogenous? How does a rise in standards in the South a⁄ect northern standards and
international capital ￿ ows?
International di⁄erences in OHS levels caused by trade unions setting high standards in
the North can lead to more or less capital in the North relative to a situation where unions
are absent. If unions in the North are moderate, capital ￿ ows to the South will be reduced
(compared to an economy without unions) as some health level is better than none and
marginal productivities of capital are higher with unions. Clearly, if unions put a lot of
emphasis on health or even when the social planner maximizes welfare, some capital will be
driven out of the country due to high OHS standards - but still less than in a laissez-faire
economy. Capital out￿ ows from the North to the South reduce safety standards in the North.
When unions become active in the South, output in the world as a whole will rise and so
will welfare. There are strong distributional e⁄ects, however, and the North might lose, as
will unions in the North. These distributional e⁄ects point to the potentially bene￿cial e⁄ects
of side payments from unions in the South to unions in the North. If this cooperation can be
achieved, Pareto gains from globalization should be possible.
The quantitative analysis has shown that the e⁄ects of integrating capital markets on
northern standards is not too high. A 1% reduction of the northern capital stock would lead
to an increase of the sickness level of less than one tenth of a percentage point. Globalization
e⁄ects on OHS standards through the channel we look at do therefore not provide an argument
against globalization. The gains from higher OHS standards in the South for the South,
however, can not be neglected. To the extend that collective action through unions can push
southern OHS standards, this is desirable for the South and the world as a whole. The
losses in the North caused by further capital out￿ ows are again negligible and are by far
overcompensated by gains in the South.
The paper has various shortcomings which can be overcome in future work. Capital is
not produced in our static model and is therefore highly rivalrous between the North and
the South. In this sense, the e⁄ects presented so far neglect positive growth e⁄ects which
would result from higher health levels in the South. A dynamic analysis could take this
into account and probably draw an even more optimistic picture of higher safety levels in
the South. Second, what happens if unions are allowed to set or bargain wages? Is the
positive e⁄ect of better OHS standards in the South undone by the labour supply distortion?
Third, how do strategic interactions between a union in the North and one in the South with
endogenous safety levels in both countries a⁄ect our conclusions? Fourth, and maybe most
importantly, the theoretical and quantitative assumption that equilibrium safety standards
(set by unions or some government agency) are lower than standards which maximize returns
23to capital owners should be formulated in a way which allows for empirical testing. All of
this is left for future work.
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